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TOURO LAW REVIEW
Therefore, the Sisario court is consistent with current federal
standards on equal protection and due process analyses with
respect to the issues addressed in that case. The federal courts use
a "one step at a time approach" to legislative initiative intending
to remedy a social or economic problem. As articulated in
Sisario, equal protection will not be violated if every aspect of an
issue is not addressed by the legislature. Further, federal analysis
parallels the Sisario decision in that access to the courts for civil
proceedings is generally not an absolute right and may be
restricted, absent a violation of fundamental constitutional rights,
if there is a rational basis for doing so.
Arnold v. Constantine 631
(decided November 15, 1990)
Recent appointees to the aviation unit of the state police
contended that the police superintendent's failure to compensate
them at the same pay rate as other pilots in the aviation unit
violated their equal protection rights under the federal632 and
state633 constitutions. The court held that there was no equal
protection violation under either the federal or state
constitutions. 634
In 1985, respondent, police superintendent decided to expand
the types of duties to be performed by the aviation unit and in-
creased the unit number of operational hours. Additionally, re-
spondent re-classified new applicants for the aviation unit as
troopers instead of the higher ranked position of technical
sergeant. 635 In 1986, four new appointees, petitioners herein,
were assigned to the aviation unit as troopers. Upon respondent's
failure to promote petitioners to technical sergeants, petitioners
brought an article 78 proceeding challenging this failure to com-
pensate them at a pay rate equal to the other pilots in the unit. 636
631. 164 A.D.2d 203, 563 N.Y.S.2d 259 (3d Dep't 1990).
632. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
633. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11.
634. Arnold, 164 A.D.2d at 206, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 261.
635. Id. at 204-05, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 260.
636. Id. at 205, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 261.
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The court based its decision on the rational relation test set
forth in Shattenkirk v. Finnery.637 For equal protection
purposes, the rational relation test requires that a regulation "be
sustained unless it bears no rational relation to a legitimate
government interest." 638 In applying the rational relation test to
the case at hand, the court determined that: 1) the government
interest in obtaining additional pilots in order to expand the pilot
program for the aviation unit was vital to the public's interest,
and hence a legitimate goal; 639 and 2) re-classifying entry-level
rank was rationally related to achieving the aforesaid purpose
because reclassification made it possible to "maintain a continuity
of qualified pilots for a vital public service without dependence
upon the availability of budget appropriations needed to create
Technical Sergeant positions." 640 Therefore, since the re-
classification in Arnold was rationally related to a legitimate
government interest, the court found that there was no equal
protection violation. 641
For equal protection purposes, New York courts apply the
same judicial standard when reviewing compensation regulations
as do the federal courts. The court in Shattenkirk stated: 1) the
equal protection clauses of the New York State Constitution and
United States Constitution provide equal coverage; 2) both pro-
visions apply to disputes involving compensation; and 3) "[flor
equal protection purposes, the appropriate standard for judicial
review of a regulation, absent a suspect classification, is that it be
sustained unless it bears no rational relation to a legitimate gov-
ernment interest." ' 642 Based on the foregoing, it is evident that
the State of New York and the federal government apply the
same standard when reviewing the validity of a compensation
637. 97 A.D.2d 51, 471 N.Y.S.2d 149 (3d Dep't 1983), aff'd, 62 N.Y.2d
949, 468 N.E.2d 53, 479 N.Y.S.2d 215 (1984).
638. Arnold, 164 A.D.2d at 206, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 261 (quoting




642. Shatenkirk, 97 A.D.2d at 55, 47 N.Y.S.2d at 153.
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regulation that is challenged on equal protection grounds. 643
SUPREME COURT
WESTCHESTER COUNTY
People v. Green 644
(decided October 3, 1990)
Defendant was accused of unauthorized use of a vehicle in the
second degree, two counts of criminal possession of stolen prop-
erty in the fourth degree and unlawful possession of marijuana.
During jury selection, the prosecutor peremptorily challenged a
prospective juror who was deaf. When questioned by the trial
judge as to why the prospective juror was being challenged, the
prosecutor responded that he had no other reason other than the
prospective juror's deafness. The court rejected the prosecutor's
explanation and permitted the prospective juror to be sworn and
seated among the other accepted jurors.645
The county court held that the state constitution's equal protec-
tion clause 646 prohibits the use of peremptory challenges based
solely upon a person's deafness. 647
In People v. Guzman,648 the court of appeals held that a
prospective juror who was also deaf could not be challenged for
cause. 649 In the case at bar, the court believed that Guzman
should be extended to peremptory challenges. The court began its
analysis by observing that the state constitutional civil rights
clause was inapplicable in this case because being deaf was not an
643. For a discussion of the federal equal protection doctrine, see supra
notes 454-57 and accompanying text.
644. 148 Misc. 2d 666, 561 N.Y.S.2d 130 (County Ct. Westchester County
1990).
645. Id. at 667, 561 N.Y.S.2d at 131.
646. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11.
647. Green, 148 Misc. 2d at 667, 561 N.Y.S.2d at 133.
648. 76 N.Y.2d 1, 555 N.E.2d 259, 556 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1990).
649. Id. at 3, 555 N.E.2d at 260, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 10; see N.Y. CRIM.
PROC. LAw § 270.20 (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1991).
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